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INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued five 
precedential trademark decisions—a slight decline from the seven 
precedential decisions issued in 2018. The cases consist of appeals from 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB or “the Board”), U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC or “the Commission”), and a U.S. 
district court. The majority of these decisions involved the issue of 
likelihood of confusion and were resolved based on longstanding 
precedent. The Federal Circuit also issued one notable decision relating 
to the requirements for specimens of use consisting of webpages. 
 
 * Stephanie H. Bald is a Partner at Kelly IP, LLP, in Washington, D.C. and an 
alumna of American University, Washington College of Law (WCL). She also serves as an Adjunct 
Professor at WCL, where she teaches a course on trademark practice and procedure. 
 ** Sara Copeland Parker is an Associate at Kelly, IP, LLP in Washington, D.C. She 
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Each of the Federal Circuit’s precedential 2019 trademark decisions 
is discussed in detail below. 
I.    LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
A.   In re Guild Mortg. Co. 
In In re Guild Mortgage Co.,1 the Federal Circuit vacated the TTAB’s 
decision that a likelihood of confusion existed between the mark 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY & Design (shown below) and the 
word mark GUILD INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT.2 
Figure 1: Guild Mortgage Co. Mark 
 
Guild Mortgage Company (“Applicant”) applied to register the mark 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY & Design for “mortgage banking 
services, namely, origination, acquisition, servicing, securitization and 
brokerage of mortgage loans.”3 The examining attorney refused 
registration based on a likelihood of confusion with Guild Investment 
Management’s (“Registrant”) prior registration for the word mark 
GUILD INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT for “investment advisory 
services,” stating that the marks, nature of the services, and trade 
channels were similar.4 The TTAB affirmed, noting that these 
similarities were sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion even 
though consumers “may exercise a certain degree of care in investing 
money, if not perhaps in seeking a mortgage loan.”5 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Applicant argued that the Board 
failed to consider relevant evidence as to concurrent use of the marks 
without evidence of actual confusion, i.e., evidence directed to the 
eighth Dupont factor of the thirteen-factor test for likelihood of 
 
 1. 912 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 2. Id. at 1378. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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confusion.6 Applicant presented evidence by way of a declaration from 
its president and CEO that it had coexisted with Registrant for over 
forty years without any evidence of actual confusion.7 The U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) argued that the Board need not have addressed 
this argument because “‘uncorroborated statements of no known instances 
of actual confusion’ of the only party involved in the case are ‘of little 
evidentiary value.’”8 The PTO also contended, during oral argument, that 
evidence related to the eighth DuPont factor was “irrelevant.”9 
The Federal Circuit held that the Board erred in failing to mention 
this factor or address Applicant’s arguments about coexistence.10 The 
Federal Circuit cited its precedent that the thirteen DuPont factors 
“must be considered” “when [they] are of record.”11 The Federal 
Circuit further noted that the consideration of coexistence with no 
evidence of actual confusion (the eighth DuPont factor) is a separate 
inquiry from the nature and extent of any actual confusion (the 
seventh DuPont factor) and thus remanded for the Board to address 
Applicant’s evidence of coexistence and reconsider its likelihood of 
confusion determination.12 
B.   VersaTop Support Systems, LLC v. Georgia Expo, Inc. 
In VersaTop Support Systems, LLC v. Georgia Expo., Inc.,13 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion on summary judgment that 
a drape and rod company did not infringe its competitor’s trademarks.14 
Georgia Expo and VersaTop are competing drape and rod 
companies. VersaTop sells a “ball and crown” coupler under the marks 
PIPE & DRAPE 2.0 and 2.0.15 Georgia Expo distributed advertising and 
brochures that contained PIPE & DRAPE 2.0 next to pictures of the 
VersaTop coupler.16 
 
 6. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) 
(creating the thirteen-factor test for determining likelihood of consumer confusion). 
 7. In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d at 1379–80. 
 8. Id. at 1380 (quoting In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1381. 
 11. Id. at 1379 (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 12. Id. at 1380–81 (citing In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d at 1317). 
 13. 921 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 14. Id. at 1372. 
 15. Id. at 1366. 
 16. Id. 
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The district court held on summary judgment that because Georgia 
Expo had not “affixed” the trademarks to goods that were sold or 
transported in commerce, it had not violated the Lanham Act.17 The 
district court cited 15 U.S.C. § 1127, which states that “use in 
commerce” requires the mark to be placed on the goods or their 
containers and that the goods be sold or transported in commerce.18 
The district court concluded that “no remedy [was] available for 
Georgia Expo’s uses of VersaTop’s trademarks.”19 
Applying Ninth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit noted that § 1127’s 
definition of “use in commerce” applies “to the required use a plaintiff 
must make in order to have rights in a mark,” not to prove infringement.20 
The Federal Circuit then analyzed the likelihood of confusion 
factors, noting that Georgia Expo had made no argument regarding 
the similarity of the marks, goods, or trade channels.21 Rather, Georgia 
Expo had argued only that no evidence of actual confusion existed.22 
The Federal Circuit held that the failure to prove instances of 
confusion was not dispositive, and the evidence was “clear and tilts 
heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion” because the marks were 
identical, the goods were related, and the marketing channels 
overlapped.23 The Federal Circuit thus concluded as a matter of law 
that Georgia Expo had infringed VersaTop’s trademarks, reversed the 
district court’s judgment in favor of Georgia Expo, and remanded the 
case for any appropriate further proceedings.24 
C.   Swagway, LLC v. ITC 
In Swagway, LLC,25 the Federal Court affirmed the ITC’s conclusion 
that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks SWAGWAY 
X1 and X2 and SWAGTRON T1 and T3 for hoverboard products, on 
the one hand, and the marks SEGWAY and SEGWAY & Design for 
motorized personal mobility devices, on the other hand. 
 
 17. Id. at 1367. 
 18. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1370 (emphasis added) (citing § 1127). 
 21. Id. at 1372. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 934 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
2020] TRADEMARK DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1335 
 
Segway, Inc. (“Segway”) offers motorized personal mobility devices 
under the registered trademarks SEGWAY and SEGWAY & Design. 
Segway filed two complaints with the ITC against Swagway, LLC 
(“Swagway”), which offered self-balancing hoverboard products under 
the marks SWAGWAY X1 and X2 and SWAGTRON T1 and T3.26 
Segway alleged Swagway’s marks infringed its SEGWAY trademarks, 
among other things.27 The ITC instituted an investigation based on the 
complaints, consolidated them, and assigned the matter to an 
administrative law judge (ALJ).28 
Swagway moved for partial termination of the investigation 
regarding the trademark infringement allegations on the basis of a 
consent order stipulation, which stipulated, among other things, that 
Swagway would not sell or import “SWAGWAY-branded personal 
transporter products as well as all components thereof, packaging and 
manuals therefor.”29 Segway opposed the stipulation and proposed 
consent order based on the fact that it addressed only a subset of the 
claims and products at issue in the investigation, and it would allow 
Swagway to relitigate issues concerning trademarks covered by that 
order.30 During a hearing in the consolidated investigation, the ALJ 
advised that the pending motion for consent order would not be ruled 
on before the end of the hearing.31 
The ALJ issued a Final Initial Determination finding, among other 
things, that Swagway’s use of SWAGWAY, but not its use of SWAGTRON, 
infringed Segway’s trademarks. This determination was based on an 
analysis of six likelihood of confusion factors: (1) evidence of actual 
consumer confusion; (2) the degree of similarity in appearance and 
pronunciation between the marks; (3) Swagway’s intent in adopting the 
marks; (4) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the 
products; (5) the degree of care exercised by consumers; and (6) the 
strength of the mark.32 
First, the ALJ found “overwhelming evidence” of actual confusion 
existed between the SWAGWAY and SEGWAY marks but only de 
 
 26. Id. at 1336. 
 27. Id. at 1335 (noting that Segway also filed six allegations of patent infringement 
that were not at issue in this appeal). 
 28. Id. at 1336. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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minimis actual confusion between the SWAGTRON and SEGWAY 
marks.33 Second, the ALJ stated the SWAGWAY and SEGWAY marks 
looked alike and had similar pronunciations, but the SWAGTRON and 
SEGWAY marks did not.34 Third, the ALJ found Swagway’s founder did 
not intend to infringe Segway’s marks because he had independently 
derived the SWAGWAY mark and then changed the designation to 
SWAGTRON after Segway’s counsel sent him a cease-and-desist 
letter.35 Fourth, the ALJ found that Segway’s and Swagway’s products 
were sold through the same websites and stores, but that the SEGWAY 
products were significantly more expensive than the SWAGWAY and 
SWAGTRON products, which weighed against a likelihood of 
consumer confusion.36 The ALJ did not make a finding as to the degree 
of care exercised by consumers because neither party presented 
evidence as to that factor.37 Finally, the ALJ found that the SEGWAY 
marks were commercially and conceptually strong because SEGWAY is 
a coined term and has strong brand recognition.38 The ALJ thus 
concluded that the SWAGWAY marks infringed Segway’s trademarks, 
but the SWAGTRON marks did not.39 The ALJ’s Final Initial 
Determination did not mention specifically Swagway’s motion for 
termination based on the consent order stipulation but stated in a 
footnote that “[a]ny pending motion that has not been adjudicated is 
denied, unless otherwise noted.”40 
Swagway filed a petition for review of the Determination. Swagway 
appealed the denial of its consent order and the finding that the 
SWAGWAY mark infringed the SEGWAY trademarks.41 The ITC 
reversed the ALJ’s finding on actual confusion, noting that compared 
to the volume of sales of SWAGWAY products, the incidents of actual 
confusion were minimal and at least some of the proffered evidence 
was unreliable.42 The Commission stated that the lack of actual 
confusion “d[id] not weigh in favor of [a finding of a] likelihood of 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1336–37. 
 35. Id. at 1337. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1336. 
 40. Id. at 1342. 
 41. Id. at 1337. 
 42. Id. 
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confusion.”43 However, the ITC affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that a 
likelihood of confusion existed between the SEGWAY and SWAGWAY 
marks based on the remaining likelihood of confusion factors 
considered by the ALJ.44 The ITC determined it would not review the 
ALJ’s denial of Swagway’s consent order motion.45 
Swagway appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the 
Commission did not give sufficient weight to the fact that there was no 
evidence of actual confusion, and the parties had coexisted for a 
substantial period of time.46 Swagway also challenged the ITC’s failure 
to enter the proposed consent order.47 
The Federal Circuit noted that evidence of concurrent use weighs 
against a likelihood of confusion but must be balanced against the 
other evidence in the record.48 Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted, 
Swagway had not argued on appeal that its evidence warranted a 
finding of long-term, concurrent use of the marks in the same trade 
channels to support its argument that a lack of actual confusion 
weighed against a likelihood of confusion.49 
The Federal Circuit rejected Swagway’s argument that the ITC failed 
to properly reweigh the likelihood of confusion factors after reversing 
the ALJ’s determination with regard to actual confusion.50 The Federal 
Circuit noted that it is appropriate to give certain factors different 
weights under different circumstances.51 In this case, the Federal 
Circuit held the ITC properly gave strong weight to the strength of the 
SEGWAY marks and the similarity of the marks.52 
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that Segway’s failure to submit a 
survey did not require the Commission to apply an adverse inference 
that such a survey would not have shown a likelihood of confusion 
between the marks.53 The Federal Circuit noted that it had previously 
declined to apply an adverse inference on this basis, and thus, the 
Commission did not err in according no weight to Segway’s lack of 
 
 43. Id. (alteration in original). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1339. 
 47. Id. at 1337. 
 48. Id. at 1339. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1340. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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survey evidence.54 The Federal Circuit accordingly affirmed the ITC’s 
conclusion that Swagway infringed Segway’s trademarks.55 
Regarding the consent order motion, the Federal Circuit rejected 
Swagway’s arguments that the ITC’s failure to provide an express 
explanation for denial of the consent order motion violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act or that the denial of Swagway’s consent 
order motion by footnote in the ITC’s decision entitled Swagway to 
relief.56 The Federal Circuit found that the denial by footnote was no 
more than harmless error.57 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the ITC’s denial of Swagway’s consent order motion.58 
D.   Hylete LLC v. Hybrid Athletics, LLC 
In Hylete LLC v. Hybrid Athletics, LLC,59 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the TTAB’s decision that applicant Hylete’s design mark shown below 
(“Hylete’s Mark”) for athletic apparel was likely to cause confusion 
with opposer Hybrid Athletics’ design mark shown below (“Hybrid’s 
Mark”) for athletic apparel and fitness services.60 
 







At the Board, Hybrid relied on its prior-filed application for Hybrid’s 
Mark for “conducting fitness classes; health club services, namely, 
providing instruction and equipment in the field of physical exercise; 
personal fitness training services and consultancy; physical fitness 
 
 54. Id. (citing Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 
F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 55. Id. at 1344. 
 56. Id. at 1342. 
 57. Id. at 1343–44. 
 58. Id. at 1344. 
 59. 931 F.3d 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 60. Id. at 1171, 1175. 
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instruction” and on common law rights from the same mark for 
athletic apparel, including shirts, hats, shorts, and socks.61 Hybrid 
submitted evidence of its mark on athletic apparel that showed 
Hybrid’s Mark above the phrase “Hybrid Athletics” and a row of dots 
as shown below (“Hybrid’s Composite Mark”). 
Figure 2: Hybrid’s Composite Mark 
 
 
Hylete argued before the Board that the differences between the two 
designs in appearance were sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion.62 
The Board disagreed, finding that both marks are stylized versions of the 
letter “H” and that the marks have similar commercial impressions.63 The 
Board relied only on Hybrid’s common-law rights after finding that it had 
failed to establish ownership of the prior-filed application.64 
Hylete filed a Request for Reconsideration of the Board’s decision, 
arguing that there was no evidence that consumers would view Hylete’s 
Mark as a stylized “H.”65 Hylete did not argue that the Board 
erroneously analyzed Hybrid’s Mark as being a stylized “H.” The Board 
 
 61. Id. at 1171–72. 
 62. Id. at 1172. 
 63. Id. at 1172–73. 
 64. Id. at 1172. 
 65. Id. at 1173. 
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rejected Hylete’s arguments in the Request for Reconsideration, 
noting that Hylete itself had characterized its mark as a stylized letter 
“H” in its briefing.66 Hylete appealed.67 
On appeal, Hylete argued that the Board erred by comparing Hylete’s 
Mark to Hybrid’s Mark rather than to Hybrid’s Composite Mark.68 The 
Federal Circuit held that Hylete had “never contended that Hybrid’s 
common law rights implicated a ‘composite common law mark’ that 
differed from the stylized ‘H’ design mark identified in the [prior-filed] 
application” and thus waived the issue on appeal.69 The Federal Circuit 
accordingly affirmed the Board’s finding of likelihood of confusion. 
II.    SPECIMENS OF USE 
A.   In re Siny Corp. 
In In re Siny Corp.,70 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision 
refusing to register the mark CASALANA based on a specimen 
consisting of a webpage printout.71 
Siny Corp. (“Siny”) sought to register CASALANA for “[k]nit pile 
fabric made with wool for use as a textile in the manufacture of 
outerwear, gloves, apparel, and accessories.”72 Siny submitted a 













 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1173–74. 
 69. Id. at 1174–75. 
 70. 920 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 71. Id. at 1337. 
 72. Id. at 1332. 
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Figure 3: Siny Webpage 
 
 
The examining attorney refused registration on the basis that the 
webpage appeared to be “mere advertising material” and did not show 
the mark’s use in commerce in connection with the goods because it 
did not include a means for ordering the goods.73 
Siny then submitted a substitute specimen showing the same webpage 
but with additional text stating “‘[f]or sales information:’ followed by a 
phone number and email address.”74 The examining attorney again 
rejected the specimen, stating that the added text only indicated how 
consumers could obtain more information necessary to make a purchase 
but was insufficient for consumers to actually make a purchase.75 The 
examining attorney noted that the specimen did not indicate minimum 
quantities for an order, cost, payment options, or shipping information.76 
Siny appealed the refusal to register to the TTAB, arguing that the 
webpage was a “display associated with the goods.”77 Siny also argued 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1334. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1334–35. 
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that because the goods are industrial materials used by manufacturers, 
the sales transaction requires assistance from Siny’s sales personnel.78 
The Board agreed with the examining attorney that the specimen 
lacked information the Board considers essential to a consumer’s 
purchasing decision, such as the price, minimum quantities required 
for an order, and payment and shipping methods.79 The Board 
rejected Siny’s argument that the fact that Siny’s sales personnel must 
assist consumers means such information is not necessary, stating that 
“while some details must be worked out by telephone, if virtually all 
important aspects of the transaction must be determined from 
information extraneous to the web page, then the web page is not a 
point of sale.”80 The Board also stated that in such cases, the applicant 
“would be well advised to provide the examining attorney with 
additional evidence and information regarding the manner in which 
purchases are actually made through the webpage.”81 In a split 
decision, the Board concluded the webpage was not a “point of sale” 
display and affirmed the examining attorney’s finding.82 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that the Board had carefully 
considered the specimen, and substantial evidence supported its 
conclusion that the specimen did not cross the line from mere 
advertising to a display associated with the goods.83 The Federal Circuit 
thus affirmed the Board’s decision.84 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit was relatively quiet in terms of trademark 
decisions in 2019. Many of the Federal Circuit’s decisions focused on 
the multi-factor likelihood of confusion test. While useful guidance for 
practitioners, these cases were not groundbreaking. The Court’s 
determination in In re Siny Corp. regarding what constitutes a proper 
specimen of use will likely have the greatest impact on the day-to-day 
practice of trademark law before the PTO. 
 
 78. Id. at 1335. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1337. 
 84. Id. 
